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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

SAMANTHA KAY FRYE FARRELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

JOHN W. TURNER, Warden,
Utah State Prison,

Case No.
12163

Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Judge, presiding, denying appellant's petition for writ of
habeas corpus.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, after a full
hearing, ordered the denial of the appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus and remanded the
appellant to the custody of the respondent.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the judgment of the
district court should be affirmed.

2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 12, 1969, appellant pleaded guilty to
a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-50-6 (1953) (furnishing implements to aid a prisoner to escape)
before the Honorable C. Nelson Day in the Fifth
Judicial District Court, in and for Iron County, State
of Utah (Arraignment Hearing, p. 5). At the arraignment hearing, Mr. Christian Ronnow was appointed
appellant's counsel, was instructed to consult with
appellant, and was told he would be allowed to
suggest withdrawal of appellant's plea after counseling with her if he felt the plea was improperly entered (Arraignment Hearing, pp. 6-8).
Appellant made no motion to withdraw her plea
and was sentenced by Judge Day on the 25th of
June, 1969, to a term of three years in the Utah State
Prison (Sentencing Hearing, p. 8). Execution of the
sentence was supended and appellant was placed
on probation (Sentencing Hearing, p. 8). On August
12, 1969, appellant's probation was revoked and
sentence executed by the Honorable James P. McCune, Fifth Judicial District Court (Revocation Hearing, p. 15).
On May 26, 1970, appellant's petition for a writ
of habeas corpus was denied after a full hearing by
the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Third Judicial
District Court. It is from that denial that this appeal
is taken.

3
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE RECORD IN THE INSTANT CASE IS NOT
SILENT CONCERNING APPELLANT'S PL E A OF
GUILTY; RATHER, THE RECORD AFFIRMATIVELY
SHOWS HER PLEA WAS KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED.

Appellant relies upon Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238 (1969) as authority for the contention that her
constitutional safeguard of due process of law was
denied by the trial court in accepting her plea of
guilty. In Arbuckle v. Turner, 306 F.Supp. 825, 826 (D.
Utah 1969), the court said:
"The necessity that a defendant's guilty plea
be voJuntarily and informed was a fundamental, constitutional principle prior to the
Boykin decision. E.g., Machibroda v. U.S., 368
U.S. 487, 493, . . . (1962) (voluntariness);
Kercheval v. U. S., 274 U.S. 220, 223, . . .
(1927) (full understanding of the consequences). Since the court in Boykin makes no
attempt to redefine or extend the concept of
"voluntary and intelligent," the pronouncement must be read in light of existing case
law."

Respondent submits that the transcript of appellant's arraignment affirmatively shows her
knowing and voluntary plea of guilty. Mrs. Farrell
was advised of the nature of the charge against her,
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the seriousness of the offense, and the sentence that
could be imposed.
THE COURT: Mrs. Farrell, you are charged
. . . with the felony of furnishing implements
to aid a prisoner to escape. This is a serious
charge and is punishable by imprisonment for
a term of years in the Utah State Prison....

*

*

*

THE COURT: Well, you understand what I
am talking about when I say this is a felony
and punishable by imprisonment for a term of
years in the Utah State Prison?
SAMANTHA FARRELL:

Yes sir.

*

*
*
[Reading of the Information by the Court]

THE COURT: Samantha Kay Frye Farrell,
what is your plea to the information just read
you, . . . are you guilty or not guilty?
SAMANTHA KAYE FRYE F A R RE LL:
Guilty.
THE COURT: By that I am to understand
that you did on or about the 23rd day of May,
1969, and within Iron County, take, carry, furnish or otherwise provide hacksaw blades to
one Douglas E. Farrell, a convicted felon,
while he was incarcerated in the Iron County
Jail, and for the purpose of aiding him in facilitating his escape?
SAMANTHA FARRELL:
THE COURT:

I did.

You did?

SAMANTHA FARRELL:

Yes.
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THE COURT: Did you know it was wrong,
against the law to do that?
SAMANTHA FARRELL: Yes sir....
(Arraignment Hearing, pp. 3-5).

The records of appellant's probation revocation
hearing and the hearing before the Honorable
Stewart M. Hanson in the court below both demonstrate Mrs. Farrell's comprehension of the consequences of her guilty plea.
THE COURT: [M] rs. Farrell, you admit that
you plead guilty to a charge of public intoxication on, or committed on or about July 11,
1969?
SAMANTHA FARRELL:

Yes sir, I do.

THE COURT: And also that you have been
charged with another criminal offense since
then [assault and battery]?
SAMANTHA FARRELL: I have been
charged but I have not been proven guilty.
(Revocation Hearing, p. 8) (Emphasis added)
BY MR. YOUNG:
Q. [I] believe you understand our judicial
procedure. Do you understand when you plead
not guilty that thereafter there will be a trial
unless you change your plea?

*
*
*
Q. Do you understand you have the right to
trial?
A.

Now?

Q.

Yes.

A.

Yes, sir; I do.
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Q. Do you understand if there are witnesses
that are called against you, you confront your
accusers, and also have the privilege of calling
your own witnesses?

A.

I think I understand that.

Q. Do you understand you have the right to
remain silent at such a trial?

A.

Such as now?

Q. Such as a trial for the crime you may be
charged with in a felony case such as in the
original case, if you had not plead guilty?
A.

No sir; I didn't understand that then.

*
*
Q. When did you learn that people are entitled to remain silent?

*

A. Because that that [sic] all shows when
they pick up people [on television shows] they
say, "Anything you say may be held against
you; you have the right to remain silent."
*
*
*
Q. Did you ever think that right to remain
silent applied to everybody, and they were
televising that was a real legal right?
A.

I never really thought about it alot.

Q.

You knew it, didn't you?

That they said that on television? Yes,
I did.
(Habeas Corpus Hearing pp. 18-22.)

A.

The transcripts cited above affirmatively show
Mrs. Farrell entered her plea of guilty advised of the

w

1e
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charges against her, aware of the possible sentence
that could be imposed, and comprehending the
consequences of the plea; this satisfies the "voluntary and intelligent" pronouncements of existing
case law. Boykin itself requires no more; that Court
said:
"Presuming waiver from a silent record is
impermissible. The record must show, or there
must be an allegation and evidence which show
that an accused was offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer.
Anything less is not waiver." [Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516, 8 L.Ed.2d 70, 77, 82
S.Ct. 884.]

"We think that the same standard must be
applied to determine whether a guilty plea is voltarily made." 395 U.S. at 242. (Emphasis added.)

Even allowing appellant the fact that the record
does not contain an item-by-item inquisition by the
trial court into Mrs. Farrell's comprehension of constitutional guarantees, respondent has presentedand the court below accepted-"an allegation and
evidence" which shows that she understandingly
entered her plea of guilty. Contrary to appellant's
claim, she did know the crime she was charged
with, she was aware of her constitutional rights, and
the trial court did take steps to insure the voluntary
and knowing character of her plea; i.e., the Honorable C. Nelson Day appointed counsel to confer
with Mrs. Farrell and did not foreclose her from
withdrawing her plea if she desired to do so (Ar-
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raignment Hearing, pp. 7-8). In Belgarde v. Turner, 307
F.Supp. 936 (D. Utah 1969), cited by appellant as
support for her proposition that Boykin requires the
court's inquiry into the defendant's understanding
of the elements of the crime and possible defenses,
the defendant was without the advise of counsel
at his arraignment and sentencing. Mrs. Farrell, on
the other hand, was provided competent counsel
and given the opportunity to withdraw her plea if,
after consulting her attorney, she wished to do so.
As easily distinguished is United States v. Lucia,
416 F.2d 920 (5th Cir. 1969). In 1964, Lucia pleaded
guilty to a charge of failure to file a taxes on wagering return (Form 730), failure to keep certain records
(26 U.S.C. § 4402); concealment of various acts (26
U.S.C. § 7201); and conspiring willfully to fail to pay
the federal excise tax on gambling (26 U.S.C. 4401).
Four years later, the Supreme Court declared the
assertion of the privilege against self-incrir:iination
to be a bar to prosecution for violating the federal
laws taxing illegal wages. Lucia, therefore dealt with
the waiver of a right which did not exist at the
time of the plea. Mrs. Farrell did not waive a right
that was judicially created after the supposed
waiver; rather, she entered the plea of guilty with
adequate understanding of pre-existing constitutional guarantees.
Finally, the no-waiver-from-a-silent-record standard of Boykin arose in a situation of deathly silence.
In that case, the defendant had been sentenced to
death and " [ s] o far as the record show [ ed], the

judge asked no questions of petitioner concerning
his plea, and petitioner did not address the court."
395 U.S. at 239. The Boykin record was "totally" silent.
Likewise was the record in McBain v. Maxwell, 1 Wash.
App. 1010, 466 P.2d 177 (1970). The McBain Court remanded the defendant to a lower court for a hearing on the voluntariness of his plea in light of the
"totally silent" record at triaL Here we do not have,
as did the Boykin and McBain courts, a totally silent
record that leaves an appellate court without means
"adequate for any review that may be later sought"
or that requires a probing of "murky memories."
Respondent contends that because Mrs. Farrell
was represented by counsel at her arraignment and
sentencing, in the light of the fact that her examination at the probation revocation and the habeas
corpus hearings show her understanding of ·constitutional guarantees and for the reason that the record in the instant case is not "totally' silent concerning the circumstances surrounding her plea, the
cases cited by appellant are inapposite and not
binding in the instant case.
In accord with respondent's position are State v.
Elledge, 81 N.M. 18, 462 P.2d 152 (1969) and People
Ferguson, ____ Mich ..... , 178 N.W.2d 490 (1970). In Elledge,
the defendant sought reversal of his conviction
via Boykin upon the grounds that, inter alia, he was
not advised of his right to trial by jury, the court did
not question him concerning his plea, and the
court did not inquire as to whether the plea was
entered voluntarily or was made under some type
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of pressure. Rejecting defendant's allegation, the
New Mexico court stated:
"Thus, defendant's reliance on Boykin is a
reliance on the indication that the trial judge
must affirmatively inquire into the voluntariness of the guilty plea. That opinion, however,
does not hold that there must be a reversal if
the trial judge does not make such an inquiry.
We do not understand Boykin to change the
rule stated by the New Mexico Supreme Court
in Neller v. State, 79 N.M. 528, 445 P.2d 949
(1968). There is stated: " . . . we recognize
that before accepting the plea of guilty a trial
court has a duty to ascertain that a defendant knows the consequences of his plea and to
advise him of those consequences if he is not
otherwise advised .... "
"Under this rule, the fact that the trial
court failed to question defendant as to his
understanding of the guilty plea, and its consequences, does not in itself provide a basis
for post conviction relief. Defendant may have
been "otherwise advised." " 462 P.2d at 153. 1

1 "We recognize that before accepting a plea of guilty a trial court
has a duty to ascertain that a defendant knows the consequences if
he is not otherwise advised. [Citations.] That a defendant is rep·
resented by counsel does not alter this rule. [Citations.] The fact of
counsel being present and having advised the defendant is a fact to
be considered in determining the question of the need for or suf·
ficiency of any admonition given by the court." Neller v. State, 79
N.M. 528, 445 P.2d 949 (1968). See also: Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-6
(1953); Williams v. Cox, 350 F.2d 847, 849 (10th Cir. 1965); Lattin v. Cox,
3'55 F.2d 397, 400 (10th Cir. 1966); Miller v. Crouse, 346 F.2d 301, 306
(10th Cir. 1965).
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While Elledges plea had been accepted prior to
the rule in Boykin, the court made no distinction between that and a post-Boykin guilty plea choosing to
discuss the facts as though Boykin was directly applicable.
In Ferguson, the defendant contended his plea of
guilty was not understandingly entered and sought
vacation of his sentence. Although involving a preBoykin plea, the Michigan court evaluated the genuineness of the plea in Boykin terms just as done in
Elledge, supra. Ferguson declared:
" [I] t is urged that, even though the Court is
not obliged to obtain expressed item-by-item
waivers of enumerated constitutional rights,
the same item-by-item advices must be given
the defendant by the judge and on the record,
before the court is justified in concluding that
the offered plea is "understandingly" made.
"Whether or not Boykin is determined
finally to have retroactive effect, we do not
interpret that case as imposing any such itemby-item advices. The extent of an accused's
"understanding" of the act of pleading guilty
varies with the capacity of the accused to understand....
"Judges are . . . competent and expected
to make such inquiry as would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the defendant
pleads guilty freely, voluntarily, and understandingly-in short, that the defendant knows
what he is doing, that he doesn't have to do
what he is doing, but he wants to do it anyway.

*

*

*
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"It is true that in Boykin v. Alabama, the
defendant was represented by counsel at the
time his plea was entered. Still, the Boykin
record was totally silent upon the question of
whether Boykin's plea was understandingly
made. The Boykin record does not show that
the trial judge even spoke to the defendant,
nor that the defendant had ever counseled with
the attorney who appeared in the court with
him.

*

*

*

"We hold;

*
"3. That a transcript of proceedings
which discloses that the defendant had discussed his plea with his attorney is not a
"silent record" within the meaning of Boykin
v. Alabama." 178 N.W.2d at 494, 495.

The record in the instant case clearly establishE
that Mrs. Farrell was provided competent counsE
and allowed to discuss her plea with him, includin
her constitutional guarantees and the defenses ope
to her in light of the facts of the case (Arraignmer
Hearing, pp. 6-10; Sentencing Hearing, pp. 2-3). R1
spondent contends, therefore, that the prese1
record is not a "silent record" of the character pr1
scribed by Boykin. On the contrary, the record c
firmatively shows that appellant was fully aware 1
the consequences of her plea of guilty and that tl
trial court was satisfied she wanted to do what sl
was doing free of any prejudicial duress or coE
cion.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons enumerated above, the respondent respectfully submits that appellant's plea
of guilty was voluntarily and knowingly entered
and that the records affirmatively show an understanding waiver of those rights secured her by the
Constitution. Therefore, the dismissal of the habeas
corpus petition by the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson of the Third District Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
LAUREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assist.ant Attorney
General
Attorneys for Respondent

